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Historians of early-modern England and British colonies have productively applied Douglas
Hay’s germinal study of mercy. In contrast, historians of the United States have overlooked the
utility of the conceptual tools Hay provided to prize open the mitigation of punishment across
time and place. In the decade that followed the First World War, disputes over the proper role
of mercy and administrative discretion were as heated as they were in Hanoverian England.
In Jazz Age New York, fears of gangsterism and concern over the apparent laxity of parole
regulations put the proponents of Progressive penology on the defensive. This article asks
what drove opinion against discretionary justice in the form of the pardon and parole, and
traces the conditions that gave rise to judgments that discretionary justice was too frequent
and injudicious. A new vision of order, fixated on penal certainty, came into sharp focus
over the 1920s, when mandatory sentencing statutes were introduced. Yet gubernatorial
clemency survived that crisis, and in 1930 parole was professionalized and placed under
stricter management. This article confirms that modernity proved no match for discretionary
justice. In its personal and administrative forms, discretion penetrates penal justice, despite
the earnest drive to certainty and the persistent demands to terrorize criminals.
Les historiens de l’Angleterre et des colonies britanniques de l’époque moderne ont utilisé
à l’envi l’étude préliminaire de Douglas Hay sur la clémence. En revanche, les historiens
spécialistes des États-Unis ont négligé l’utilité des outils conceptuels proposés par M. Hay

*
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latest book is Discretionary Justice: Pardon and Parole in New York, from the Revolution to the
Depression (New York: New York University Press, 2016).
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pour envisager l’allègement des sanctions en termes de durée et de lieu. Au cours de la
décennie qui a suivi la Première Guerre mondiale, les débats sur le rôle de la clémence et de
la discrétion administrative ont ainsi engendré des querelles aussi vives que dans l’Angleterre
des Hanovre. À New York à l’ère du jazz, les craintes à l’égard du gangstérisme et l’inquiétude
envers le laxisme apparent des règles en matière de libération conditionnelle ont mis les
partisans de la pénologie progressiste sur la défensive. Cet article examine les facteurs
qui ont mobilisé l’opinion contre la justice discrétionnaire, matérialisée sous la forme de la
grâce et de la libération conditionnelle. Il retrace également les conditions dans lesquelles
les tribunaux ont rendu des décisions jugeant la justice discrétionnaire trop fréquente et
injuste. En effet, une nouvelle vision de l’ordre, axée sur la certitude pénale, est clairement
apparue dans les années 1920, lorsque des lois sur les peines obligatoires ont été adoptées.
Néanmoins, la clémence du gouvernement a survécu à cette crise et, en 1930, la libération
conditionnelle a été confiée à des professionnels et assortie d’une gestion plus stricte. Cet
article confirme que la modernité n’a eu aucune influence sur la justice discrétionnaire.
Dans ses formes personnelles et administratives, la discrétion imprègne la justice pénale, en
dépit d’un fort désir de certitude et des demandes persistantes pour terroriser les criminels.
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THE POWER TO PARDON, an enduring aspect of criminal justice with ancient

and divine roots, resurfaced as a political issue in the late twentieth century,
as mandatory sentencing laws consigned hundreds of thousands of petty
criminals along with serious violent offenders to long-term incarceration in many
advanced democracies.1 In the United States, some social justice advocates have
questioned the prospect of pardoning as a potential remedy, citing its tendency
to favour the white and wealthy, but assertive voices have begun to urge the
1.

A key work on this phenomenon remains David Garland’s book. See David Garland,
The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2001).
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more vigorous use of discretionary clemency to alleviate the pains of mandatory
imprisonment.2 This debate rests on narrow ground, however. Until recently,
scholars have concentrated on presidential pardoning, despite the fact that most
offenders are convicted under state criminal laws.3 When Illinois Governor
George Ryan decided in 2003 to pardon four men on death row and to commute
the life sentences of 167 prisoners he exposed state executives’ power to mitigate
the punishment for most criminal offences. Ryan’s dramatic demonstration
of discretionary justice has inspired socio-legal scholarship that productively
questions mercy’s relationship with the terror of capital punishment and the
slow death of life without parole.4 The significance of discretionary justice in
contemporary US penal politics could not be clearer, and the need to rectify
the dearth of historical research on the subject in US state history could not
be more pressing.
This article takes up that challenge by applying Douglas Hay’s germinal
study of mercy—the neglected “other face” of criminal justice—to debates over
discretionary justice in Prohibition-era New York.5 Despite claims that colonial
contexts provide the most fruitful sites to test Hay’s analysis, the broader insights
in his essay are well-suited to prize open the mitigation of punishment in any
jurisdiction or period.6 Mercy, Hay argued, operates not according to law or
rules but in response to politics, “mental and social structures,” and the ever

2.

3.

4.
5.
6.

On the prejudicial patterns of presidential pardoning, see Robin Respaut, Al Shaw & Krista
Kjellman Schmidt, “Timeline: A History of Pardons” (December 2011), online: <www.
propublica.org/special/timeline-a-history-of-pardons>. On pardon advocacy to rectify
injustice, see Margaret Colgate Love, “Reinventing the President’s Pardon Power” (2007)
20:5 Fed Sent R 5; Margaret Colgate Love, “Fear of Forgiving: Rule and Discretion in the
Practice of Pardoning” (2000-2001) 13:3-4 Fed Sent R 125.
Jeremy Crouch, “The Law: The Presidential Misuse of the Pardon Power” (2008) 38:4
Pres Stud Q 722; PS Ruckman Jr, “Executive Clemency in the United States: Origins,
Development, and Analysis (1900–1993)” (1997) 27:2 Pres Stud Q 251; Kathleen
Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1989).
Austin Sarat, Mercy on Trial: What it Means to Stop an Execution (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005); Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain, eds, Forgiveness, Mercy and Clemency
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007).
Douglas Hay, “Foreward” in Carolyn Strange, ed, Qualities of Mercy: Justice, Punishment and
Discretion (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1996) vii at viii-ix.
Jim Phillips, “Albion’s Empire: Property, Authority and the Criminal Law in
Eighteenth-Century Canada” (2006) 10 LH 21 at 26.
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shifting “problem of public order.”7 With this checklist of criteria to interrogate,
and mindful, as he was, of discretionary justice’s contingency, the historian of
mercy can range beyond the well-charted histories of England and its former
colonies.8 Bridging from that rich historiography, mercy’s politics can be charted
to capture its contours and its sometimes seismic shifts. The questions Hay first
formulated to analyze Hanoverian England are timeless: What drives opinion in
favour of mercy or against its use? When is clemency judged to be too frequent
or indiscreet? How and why do the “mental worlds” that give mercy its meanings
change hue? If, as Hay stressed, the history of discretionary justice is made by
individuals, not dictated by systems or ideologies, why do certain individuals’
voices accrue authority?
In post-World War I New York the fear of gun-related violence created a
volatile setting for debate over administrative and executive discretionary justice.
Whereas industrialization and urbanization stoked similar concerns in mid
eighteenth-century England, Prohibition-related gangsterism, and the apparent
ease with which bandits preyed on the public with little risk of punishment,
produced a political environment hostile to any hint of mercy, whether in the
form of the governor’s pardon or the parole board’s grants of release. Property
and authority seemed under attack, and a modern version of the gentry—
captains of industry—banded with Republican politicians to wage war against
crime. The proponents of Progressive penology, whose authority rose over the
late nineteenth and early twentieth century, lost credibility after Prohibition
came into force in 1919. Over the next decade a new vision of justice, fixated
with penal certainty, came into sharp focus. By the late 1920s, when mandatory
sentencing statutes were introduced, executive clemency was constrained by
governors’ worries over appearing soft on crime, not by legislative or constitutional
change. Yet gubernatorial clemency survived that crisis, and in 1930 parole was
professionalized and placed under stricter management. Modern administrative
discretion and the pardon came to coexist in one of the most forward-looking
penal jurisdictions in the world.

7.
8.

Douglas Hay, “Property, Authority and the Criminal Law” in Douglas Hay et al, eds, Albion’s
Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (London: Allen Lane, 1975)
17 at 24, 26, 53 [Hay, “Property”].
For key works, see Jim Phillips, “The Operation of the Royal Pardon in Nova Scotia,
1749-1815” (1992) 42:4 UTLJ 401; Peter King, Crime, Justice and Discretion in England,
1740-1820 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Simon Devereaux, “Peel, Pardon, and
Punishment” in Devereaux & Paul Griffiths, eds, Penal Practice and Culture, 1500-1900:
Punishing the English (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 258.
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I. RATIONALIZING REPUBLICAN EXECUTIVE DISCRETION
The framers and subsequent defenders of the US Constitution needed no
convincing that the pardon was a matter for careful consideration. Alexander
Hamilton deployed his political persuasiveness and rhetorical flare in the 1780s
to ensure that the Chief Executive was assigned constitutional authority to grant
pardons unfettered by any check or balance from the judicial or legislative branch
of government. Although a revolutionary leader, Hamilton took his cue from
Locke and Blackstone, not radicals such as Thomas Paine who warned that any
hint of monarchical fiat would lead to tyranny.9 Hot-headed republicans might
wish to strike out executive discretion (indeed, Pennsylvania’s first Constitution
substituted an elected council),10 but Hamilton argued successfully that the
nation’s leader must have the option to win over enemies in volatile times.
In the rebel states no less than the old empire, justice must bear a benevolent
countenance to curry loyalty.
Today’s advocates of a more robust exercise of clemency typically refer to
the framers and founders of the federal justice system to justify their pleas.11
The historiographical preoccupation with the presidency and the passage of the
Constitution has ensured that the origins of executive pardoning at the federal
level have been studied intensively.12 Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story saw
nothing unfitting in the Republic’s incorporation of a power long associated
with the royal prerogative and the divine right of kings. In 1833 he wrote that
the “power of pardon” was not “incompatible with the fundamental principles
of a republic.” On the contrary: “it may be boldly asserted to be peculiarly
appropriate, and safe in all free states; because the power can there be guarded by

9. Ron Chernow, Alexander Hamilton (New York: Penguin, 2004) at 253-59.
10. John Dinan, “The Pardon Power and the American State Constitution Tradition” (2003)
35:3 Polity 389 at 396.
11. Paul Rosenzweig, “A Federalist Conception of the Pardon Power” (4 December 2012) 89
Legal Memorandum 1 (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation).
12. For the first substantial study, see Willard H Humbert, The Pardoning Power of the President
(Washington, DC: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941). For a review of this work and
subsequent scholarship, see PS Ruckman Jr, “The Study of Mercy: What Political Scientists
Know (and Don’t Know) about the Pardon Power” (2012) 9:3 U St Thomas LJ 783.
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a just responsibility for its exercise.”13 References to such high-minded statements
and to pardoning’s constitutional validity may have buoyed recent efforts to
reinvigorate executive clemency, but they tell us nothing about the ways that
discretionary justice operated once it was put into practice. With few exceptions,
historians have also failed to examine the impact of parole in its various guises,
treating it separately from pardoning. Finally, the need for grounded studies of
mercy’s past, as it transformed in conjunction and tension with parole, is most
pressing at the level of states.

II. A CASE FOR STATE-BASED STUDIES OF DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE
Leading socio-legal scholars, notably Austin Sarat, David Garland, and Jonathan
Simon, have drawn on Hay’s work since the 1980s to explore the historical roots
of contemporary penal politics, but just two historians of the United States have
followed suit.14 Vivien M.L. Miller’s and Ethan Blue’s histories of discretionary
justice in Florida, California, and Texas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries have confirmed the enduring importance of patronage.15 In these states
white elites exerted influence that determined which prisoners were reprieved
from execution or spared from serving their full prison sentences, either by
pardon boards or by governors in consultation with administrative appointees.
Stark inequalities of class, race, and gender were reinforced through the exercise
of mercy, since petitioners could urge and sponsor clemency, in many cases
on condition that released prisoners work for employers under exploitative
13. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States; with a Preliminary Review
of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States before the Adoption of the Constitution
(Boston: Hilliard, Gray, and Company, 1833) vol 3 at para 1491.
14. See e.g. Sarat, supra note 4; David Garland, “Sociological Perspectives on Punishment”
(1991) 14 Crime Just 115; Jonathan Simon, Poor Discipline: Parole and the Social Control
of the Underclass, 1890-1990 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993). Garland later
included an essay by Douglas Hay (“Hanging and the English Judges: The Judicial Politics of
Retention and Abolition”) in his collection, co-edited with Randal McGowan and Michael
Meranze, America’s Death Penalty: Between Past and Present (New York: New York University
Press, 2011) 129.
15. Vivien ML Miller, Crime, Sexual Violence, and Clemency: Florida’s Pardon Board and Penal
System in the Progressive Era (Gainsville, FL: University Press of Florida, 2000); Ethan Blue,
Doing Time in the Depression: Everyday Life in Texas and California Prisons (New York:
New York University Press, 2012). My own work continues in their footsteps. See Carolyn
Strange, Discretionary Justice: Pardon and Parole in New York from the Revolution to the
Depression (New York: New York University Press, 2016).
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conditions that underlined recipients’ subservience. Hanoverian England was
distant in time and space from Progressive Era Florida or Texas and California
during the Depression, yet the economic and social dynamics Hay identified
played out in line with similar asymmetries through discretionary justice.16
The US Constitution delegated to the states the responsibility to determine
criminal law as well as the conditions under which penalties might be mitigated.
Since many states maintained gubernatorial authority over mercy’s dispensation
well after parole became the dominant mode of discretionary release for prisoners,
Hay’s analysis of terror, mercy, and majesty need not be considered a foreign
historiographical import. Of all the states, New York was arguably the most
majestic in its retention of the governor’s power to pardon, and according to one
constitutional scholar, its founding set a precedent for a strong federal executive.17
After the state’s First Constitution of 1777, which granted the legislature the
power to pardon in cases of treason and murder, the Constitution of 1821 boosted
executive authority, giving governors sole authority to pardon or commute death
sentences for murder. Despite the ratification of three subsequent Constitutions,
the governor of the State of New York retains to this day full latitude to grant
pardons and commute sentences.18 Thus, when New York’s parole board assumed
responsibility in 1930 for screening and appraising clemency requests in all but
capital cases, this transformation of discretionary justice was administrative, not
constitutional in nature.
Why did the governor’s pardoning prerogative persist despite mounting
hostility toward discretionary justice in the 1920s? The answer lies, surprisingly,
in the assault on discretionary justice, which advanced over the decade and
culminated in the passage in 1926 of the first suite of mandatory imprisonment

16. For an equally significant article which also draws on Hay’s essay, see Stephen Garton,
“Managing Mercy: African Americans, Parole and Paternalism in the Georgia Prison System,
1919-1945” (2003) 36:3 J Soc Hist 675.
17. Daniel J Hulsebosch, Constituting Empire: New York and the Transformation of
Constitutionalism in the Atlantic World, 1664-1830 (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 2005) at 175-76.
18. The State of New York adopted a third Constitution in 1846, a fourth in 1894 and a fifth
in 1938, which has been amended several times. For the current Constitution (effective 1
July 2014), see New York Department of State, “New York State Constitution” (1 January
2014), online: <www.dos.ny.gov/info/constitution.htm>. For the authoritative history of the
New York Constitution, see Charles Z Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York From
the Beginning of the Colonial Period to 1905, Showing the Origin, Development, and Judicial
Construction of the Constitution, 5 vols (Rochester: The Lawyers Co-Operative, 1906).
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statutes in the United States, commonly known as the Baumes laws.19 Named after
Caleb H. Baumes, the powerful Republican senator who proudly bore the face
of law and order, these laws included a statute that imposed life sentences on all
felony offenders after a third felony conviction. Baumes battled alongside business
leaders and newspaper editors who attacked discretionary justice in all its forms,
including gubernatorial clemency. Yet parole was their enemy number one, since
it appeared to permit bureaucrats to work behind closed doors for the criminal’s
benefit, not the security of the law-abiding public. Defenders of mandatory life
sentences contended that criminals less deserving of severe punishment could still
petition the governor for mercy. Ironically, the most conservative opponents of
administrative discretion defended executive prerogative power.

III. THE CRIME WAVE AND THE POLITICS OF DISCRETION
The short duration of US participation in the First World War did not shield it
from a post-war crime wave, or at least the general impression that lawlessness
was rife. Crime, especially gun-related violence, followed with the return of
servicemen, a pattern historians have tracked in other post-war contexts.20 But
several factors maintained its momentum in the 1920s, especially in New York
City.21 One was the growing availability of automobiles—tempting objects to steal
and a means to evade authorities. Another was the profits to be made through the
illicit liquor trade.22 Newspaper editors complained that “automobile bandits”
went on crime sprees, while states such as New York still allowed prisoners the
means to reduce their sentences through “good time” and to apply for parole.23
Many legal experts questioned the veracity of claims that crime was out of control

19. Victoria Nourse, “Rethinking Crime Legislation: History and Harshness” (2004) 39:4
Tulsa L Rev 925.
20. See e.g. Lawrence M Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (New York: Basic
Books, 1993) at 449-52.
21. In New York City the jump in homicides was greater after the First World War than after
any other previous war. Eric Monkkonen, Murder in New York City (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2001) at 18-19.
22. See e.g. Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the American State (New
York: WW Norton & Co, 2016).
23. “America’s Crime Wave,” New York Tribune (16 February 1919) 3.
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but headlines spoke louder, and a pervasive sense of fear clouded the mental
world of 1920s New York.24
Crime was the Jazz Age’s seedy underbelly in post-war America, which
novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald portrayed in The Great Gatsby (1925). The novel’s
setting—Sands Point, Long Island—was the real-life location for a series of
robberies that took place in the summer of 1921, when a gang of thieves made
off with gold, coins, jewellery, and $40,000 in stock certificates, the property
of Commodore Frank S. Hastings—yachtsman, ranchman, and financier.25
Although police captured the bandits, who were subsequently convicted, this
show of law enforcement failed to inspire Hastings’ confidence that justice would
be served. One of the gunmen bragged after his conviction that he expected a
“speedy release,” since he had sufficient “political influence” to secure parole.
More brazenly, the “thug” vowed to return to Sands Point, to rob the rich
residents and kill Hastings.26 Under the circumstances the law’s deterrent majesty
was sorely wanting.
By the 1920s, leaders of government and industry felt pressured to take
action against unwarranted discretionary justice. “Governor Sees Crime Wave
Due to ‘Living Fast,’” was the New York Times’ headline for Republican Governor
Nathan Miller’s January 1922 address to the state legislature on the problem. New
York’s governors, elected directly by the people, delivered periodic messages to
the legislature on matters of the moment, and their annual addresses commented
on the general state of affairs, alerted politicians to policies under review, and
highlighted matters they might act upon. Miller attempted to allay public anxiety
over the audacity of criminals by stressing that he kept a tight rein on his use of
clemency, unlike his immediate predecessor, Democrat Alfred E. Smith, who
had “let a good many people out of prison” through his liberal use of the pardon
power. Miller announced that he had granted just two pardons and commuted
the sentences of twelve prisoners over the previous year. “I understand I have a
reputation for being hard-hearted,” he conceded, but the governor’s prerogative
must be “exercised very sparingly, with ‘very’ underscored … It is a power in
which sentiment and sympathy should be very carefully controlled.”27 Only a
24. When the Medico-Legal Society of New York met early in 1922, one member stated, “there
is no crime wave,” but simply an increase in young men’s use of guns, “owing to the use
of firearms in the army.” Alexander Karlin “For Suspended Sentences,” New York Times
(12 January 1922) 4.
25. Donald L Miller, Supreme City: How Jazz Age Manhattan Gave Birth to Modern America
(New York: Simon & Shuster, 2014).
26. “Miller Defends the Parole Board,” New York Times (15 January 1922) 16.
27. “Governor Sees Crime Wave Due to ‘Living Fast,’” New York Times (20 January 1922) 1.
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strong office holder could resist the urge to pardon out of sympathy, and the
Times applauded Miller’s stingy record: “He has been very sparing, indeed some
have called him niggardly.”28
Miller’s favourable headlines notwithstanding, he was keenly aware that
public confidence in criminal justice was on the wane, especially in the minds of
wealthy New Yorkers. Two weeks before the governor’s statement to the legislature
Commodore Hastings had written Miller to express his “intense indignation”
over the anticipated parole of the men who had robbed him. He had also hired
a lawyer to present a formal protest against the paroling of dangerous criminals
“on fake pretext and crocodile tears.” Although New York’s governors played no
direct role in the state’s parole system or its related indeterminate sentencing laws,
introduced in 1889, Hastings and his well-heeled neighbours demanded that the
governor take action against the paroling of “arch fiends.”29 One such man was
an African American former parolee named Luther Boddy, who had shot and
killed two white detectives in New York City just days before Hastings wrote the
governor.30 Yet the Commodore was less exercised over this “cop fighter” than he
was over the white men who served on the Board of Parole:
We are in greater danger from that board than we are from the thugs themselves. We
can kill the thugs, and are prepared to do so; but we seem to have no redress against
the action of the Parole Board, which all agree is a menace to public safety.31

Threatened with elite vigilantism, Governor Miller publicly backed the
board, but privately he put its chairman on notice.32 Thereafter repeat offenders
and “life men” were to be paroled rarely, and he admonished the board to refer
any such exceptional cases to the governor’s office.33 In the niggardly pardoner’s
mind, executive clemency was more judicious than the opaque decisions of
state bureaucrats.
In the 1922 State elections Alfred Smith made a comeback, riding on
support for his calls to modify the federal restrictions on alcohol.34 His tenure
28. Ibid.
29. Hastings to Miller, Papers of Governor Nathan L. Miller (11 January 1922; 15 January 1922),
Albany NY, New York State Archives (box 14, file 150-586, 13682-78B) [Miller Papers].
30. “Negro Bandit Kills 2 Police Detectives,” New York Times (6 January 1922) 1. The officers
had attempted to question Boddy on suspicion of robbery and murder.
31. Hastings to Miller, Miller Papers, supra note 29 (11 January 1922).
32. “Miller Defends Parole Board,” New York Times (15 January 1922) 1.
33. Miller to George W Benham, Miller Papers, supra 29 (January 17, 1922). Benham was the
board’s Chairman and a fellow Republican.
34. Christopher M Finan, Alfred E. Smith: The Happy Warrior (New York: Hill and Wang,
2002) at 171-72.
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this time would, however, be longer and far bumpier than Miller’s, since the
state’s legislature remained Republican controlled over the 1920s. Most of the
metropolitan dailies, led by the Brooklyn Eagle, amplified that party’s call for
tougher laws with fewer loopholes for criminals to evade punishment. The
Democratic governor’s use of his discretionary powers was closely watched
and frequently condemned, but when it came to the Board of Parole’s actions
Smith shared his opponents’ concerns that administrative discretion required an
overhaul. Indeed, he went so far as to endorse the many academic criminologists
and psychologists, who claimed that criminal sentencing ought to be a matter
for experts, not judges or parole authorities. As Smith no doubt anticipated,
the Republican majority rejected his proposal; instead, they rammed through a
sheaf of regressive statutes in 1926, which left the governor’s power to pardon the
felon’s only hope to leave prison alive.

IV. THE FAILINGS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISCRETION
By the 1920s the Empire State operated the largest and most differentiated
penal-correctional system in the United States. Historians such as David J.
Rothman, Nicole Hahn Rafter and Rebecca McClennan have emphasised New
York’s leadership in experimenting with new forms of prison management,
such as Sing Sing warden Thomas Mott Osborne’s “Mutual Welfare League.”35
Scholars have also emphasized the rising influence of experts, and their methods
of classifying, treating, and releasing prisoners under the rubric of indeterminate
sentencing.36 The Elmira Reformatory in upstate New York led the world in
devising means to screen inmates for medical and moral ‘deviations’ and to
monitor parolees after release. The search for ‘defectives’ and attempts to sift
them out broadened and became more sophisticated over the 1910s, as New
York introduced psychological clinics in the Bedford Hills Reformatory for
Females and Sing Sing State Prison. Psychiatrists, psychologists, social workers,
and criminologists entered prisons, turning inmates into ‘cases’ requiring expert

35. David J Rothman, Conscience and Convenience: the Asylum and its Alternatives in Progressive
America (Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1980); Nicole Hahn Rafter, Partial Justice:
Women in State Prisons, 1800-1935 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1985); Rebecca
M McLennan, The Crisis of Imprisonment Protest, Politics, and the Making of the American
Penal State, 1776–1941 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
36. For an historic analysis of the rise, fall, and resurfacing of indeterminate sentencing, see Fiona
Doherty, “Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of Supervised Release” (2013)
8:3 NYUL Rev 958.
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judgement.37 Critical histories of Progressive penology have emphasized that
punitive convenience consistently trumped the corrective consciences of the men
and women whose authority rested on their training in social and behavioural
science.38 Histories of parole in the United States share this dim view of Progressive
penology: The supervision of parolees expanded the carceral state, leading to
more intensive governance of poor and African American communities.39
These damning depictions of penal modernity’s class, race, and gender biases
would have been unrecognizable to New Yorkers in the post-war era, whether
friends or foes of Progressivism. This does not mean the state’s penal system
lacked critics; rather, criticism was filtered through a different lens in the 1920s.
Metropolitan newspapers sold by the tens of thousands by blaring that crime was
skyrocketing. Far from net widening, it looked to most New Yorkers that the
prison system needed to punish more criminals and incarcerate them longer.40
City and state police authorities felt the heat of public demands for order, but
parole authorities were scorched over their handling of administrative discretion.
Even parole’s supporters, such as Brooklyn Mayor John F. Hylan, condemned
New York’s system: “The beneficent purposes of the parole system … have been
too frequently disfigured by a mushy sentimentality… [there have been] too
many instances of criminals to whom mercy was injudiciously extended.” With
friends like Hylan the discretionary release of prisoners needed no enemies, but
they lined up in force by the mid 1920s. Every time a previously paroled inmate
committed a violent crime bold headlines convinced New Yorkers that the “loose
administration of the parole law” must come to an end.41
Criminal justice authorities, particularly academics and contributors to
highbrow magazines, were sceptical of newspaper editors’ claims, but few believed
that the ideals of screened and monitored release had been implemented.42 From
its origins in the 1840s the Prison Association of New York (PANY) advocated
37. These diagnostic terms, favoured by Progressives, were stigmatic. Rothman, supra
note 35 at 328.
38. Supra note 35.
39. For the most influential work on this topic, see Simon, supra note 14. See also, A Keith
Bottomley, “Parole in Transition: A Comparative Study of Origins, Developments and
Prospects for the 1990s” (1990) 12 Crime & Just 319.
40. The term “net widening” refers to the expansion of social control that attends various forms
of penal diversion. Thomas G Blomburg, “Foreword,” in Rothman, surpa note 35 at xii.
41. “Criminals and the Courts,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (8 January 1922) 4B.
42. Raymond Moley, An Outline of the Cleveland Crime Survey (Cleveland: The Cleveland
Foundation, 1922) at 57. Over one month in 1919, Moley (who held a PhD in political
science from Columbia University) found that the amount of crime coverage in Cleveland
had increased seven-fold, while the rate of crime had stayed steady.
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penal modernization, and it claimed credit for introducing parole to the state in
the 1870s at Elmira. Initially, the organization considered the State’s selection
criteria for Board of Parole appointments perfectly acceptable. A record of
public service did nicely, as did the assumption that middle-aged white men of
probity could be trusted to exercise “great discrimination and sound judgment.”43
PANY applauded New York’s decision to hire physicians and psychiatrists to report
on parole applicants’ suitability for release, detailing their physical and mental
‘defects,’ but the organization found it worrying that the board’s decisions took
little account of this expertise. In his 1921 Annual Report the Secretary of PANY
praised New York’s embrace of “modern efforts in the solution of the treatment
of crime and delinquency,” but he decried the amateurish administration of
parole. If the board failed to modernize, public demand for harsher justice
would continue to escalate. Nothing but an authoritative and judicious system
of discretionary release would stifle the “loud clamor for a reversion to more
punitive forms of treatment for law breakers.”44 These were prescient words. Over
Governor Smith’s second and third term that clamour became deafening in the
press and, more significantly, the legislature responded.

V. THE PRESSER AFFAIR AND THE PURSUIT OF PENAL
CERTAINTY
If wealthy Long Islanders managed to turn their victimization into an attack
on parole in the early 1920s, the Izzy Presser affair of 1926 nearly destroyed the
concept of indeterminate punishment and the discretionary mechanisms that
controlled it. Isadore “Izzy” Presser was the sort of criminal who gave believers
in the crime wave reason to accuse the parole system of abetting criminality.
Presser began his lawless life in his teens, and his use of firearms earned him the
profile of a gun-toting gangster. In 1915 Presser and an associate gunned down
another underworld figure before witnesses. Indicted for pre-meditated murder,
he chose to plead guilty to manslaughter in the first degree, which earned him
a sixteen-year sentence, reducible through “good time” credits.45 By 1926 the
District Attorney’s earlier decision to accept a plea was not the discretionary act
43. State of New York, Prison Department, Annual Report of the Superintendent of State Prisons for
the Year Ending September 30, 1902 (February 1903) at 13.
44. Prison Association of New York, Annual Report of the Prison Association of New York, 1921
(Albany, NY: JB Lyon, 1921) 23 at 24-25 [PANY, Report].
45. “Two Gangsters Plead Guilty to Murder and Get 12 Years Each,” New York Evening World
(10 August 1915) 3.
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that incensed the public; rather, it was the Board of Parole’s decision to release
Presser on parole. In April the public learned that the gunman, who had racked
up numerous misconduct charges and escaped prison in 1921, was to be paroled
into the custody of the Jewish Board of Guardians. New York’s Superintendent
of Prisons, an ex officio member of the state board, had evidently dismissed the
prisoner’s “black marks” and recommended that he be released on parole.46
The Brooklyn Eagle’s editor could not have wished for a better case. By law,
Presser should have been tried for jail-breaking and required, at the very least,
to serve out his full original sentence. Over the previous few years the paper had
depicted parole as a system run by “sob sisters” posing as judicious men. Stronger
words seemed appropriate in this case, which gave off the stench of corruption
on top of incompetence. “VICIOUS CRIMINAL TO BE FREED,” the Eagle
screeched, calling the Board’s decision “another flagrant illustration of the way in
which notorious and vicious criminals are slipped out of State prisons through an
abuse of the parole system.”47 Presser’s controversial parole provided compelling
evidence that administrative discretion endangered public safety.
Parole’s embattled supporters had their own reasons to find the case troubling.
There was no question that parole, whatever its failings, had become an essential
cost-saving measure and the chief means to manage the burgeoning number of
prisoners in the country’s largest penal system. Its repeal would spell more than
a defeat for Progressive penological principles: it was a recipe for calamity in the
already overburdened prison system. The fiasco prompted Governor Smith to take
bold action against the board, by ordering it to rescind Presser’s parole pending
an investigation into the case and the parole system’s operations at large.48 This
showdown asserted executive discretion’s superiority over administrative justice,
with Smith exhibiting the “just responsibility” the founding fathers had granted
the president’s office. Taking a tough stand against the board also allowed the
Democratic governor to claim a leadership position in the mounting war against
crime. In the summer of 1925 industry leaders, including Elbert H. Gary, the
chairman of the board of US Steel, had beaten Smith to the field of battle when

46. “Long Unfit for his Office,” The Long Islander (30 April 1922) 1. The Board of Parole
comprised the State Superintendent, acting with two governor-appointed members. US,
An Act Constituting the State Prison Commission, a State Board of Parole, and Authorizing it to
Parole the Prisoners in State Prisons; NY, Laws of the State of New York, NY, 1901, c 260.
47. “Vicious Criminal to be Freed Next Week on Parole,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (23 April 1926) 1.
48. Governor Smith to James L Long (30 April 1926), in Alfred E Smith, Public Papers of Alfred
E. Smith, Governor of New York, 1923–1928, vol 3 (Albany, NY: JB Lyon, 1938) at 514
[Smith, Public Papers].
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they took command of what they termed a “citizen’s anti-crime crusade.”49 At that
point, “big business” had invited the governor along to their initial meeting out
of courtesy. Less than a year later the bungled parole of Izzy Presser put the chief
executive back in charge, determined to revamp parole.

VI. QUESTIONING ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY
Since the early 1920s the parole problem had vexed men of property and lent
support to Smith’s political rivals. In 1925 one Republican observer of New York’s
criminal justice system summed up his party’s view: “the laws are too lax, the
parole board is—well—rotten, and the judges are too lax in imposing sentences
under the laws we now have.”50 Republican Senator Baumes added personal clout
to this cause. In the guise of delivering a report on the state of civil and criminal
law in March of 1926, he laid out his formula for root and branch reform. Based
on his claim that violent crime in New York had doubled in the previous five
years, Baumes demanded that scope for discretion be narrowed: “The present
conditions demand firmness in all officials having to do with the administration
of criminal law and that of executive pardons.”51 Although he saved his harshest
remarks for the Board of Parole, Baumes also judged the current governor too
soft: “leniency in any official heartens the criminal.”52 Thus, Smith’s reprimand
of the board a month later and his appointment of a Commissioner were two
counterpunches that followed the senator’s swipe. Penal politics were intensely
personal in this policy ring, and both men were prepared to go the distance.
When commissioner George W. Alger delivered his report on parole late
in 1926 he concluded that the system had failed to keep pace with up-to-date
methods of case management.53 Over the course of his investigation, Alger
uncovered evidence that three board members, travelling once per month on
a circuit of the state’s prisons, had to process fifty to seventy-five applicants per
day. The chairman, George Benham, admitted that board members did not use
49. “Gary in Body to Fight Crime,” Pittsburgh Gazette Times (30 July 1925) 1.
50. “Clayton Indorses Gov. Smith’s Plan for a Crime Board,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (2 August 2
1925) 6A. Walter F Clayton sided with fellow Republicans, who urged the Board of Parole’s
abolition, so that it could work “in favor of the average citizen instead of the criminal
and law-breaker.”
51. Caleb Howard Baumes, New York (State) Legislature, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee
on the Civil and Criminal Practice Acts (Albany, NY: JB Lyon Company, 1926).
52. Ibid.
53. Report of Commissioner on Board of Parole and Parole System (1926), in Smith, Public
Papers, supra note 48 at 519-34 [Report of Commissioner].
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a points system to appraise prisoners’ eligibility; instead, they considered “the
look” of them, and offered offenders what he termed “fatherly advice.”54 When
it came to reports from prison physicians and psychiatrists, Benham stated
(correctly) that they were not obliged to consider evidence of mental or physical
defects. Alger found it extraordinary to hear that the board relied on the word
of prisoners and their keepers, rather than examining each applicant’s ‘social
history.’ When he questioned the official who had recommended Presser’s parole,
Superintendent James L. Long, he received a similar response about the vague
criteria for parole. Alger persisted: “So that when you really get down to the
question of what the parole board has to judge a man by it is how he appears,
plus what the shop [overseer] says about his conduct?”55 Long saw nothing wrong
with this approach, since prisoners had the “right” to expect parole once they
served their minimum sentences without violating prison rules. In his final report
Alger condemned Long’s orientation toward prisoners’ rights: “It is not enough
that the Parole Board should, as it says, ‘retain the respect and confidence of the
prisoner.’”56 Because prisoners were typically paroled after serving their minimum
sentences, Alger concluded that the board had lost “the respect and confidence
of society itself.”57 A suspect system of discretionary justice, not just New York’s
“arch criminals,” had eroded confidence in the law.58
Commissioner Alger did not advocate the abolition of parole or the cessation
of pardoning, as some law and order advocates wished. His prognosis was that
the Progressive programme of indeterminate sentencing, parole, and probation,
introduced in the late nineteenth century, would ultimately prove its worth
if parole were to become based on “facts,” which added up to a “reasonable
probability” of an inmate’s likelihood of “remaining at liberty without violating
the law.”59 Because New York had underfunded and undermanned the operation
of the board these ideals had yet to be properly evaluated. To become more
than a “moral gesture,” Alger advised, parole required the state’s investment in a
full-time body of properly trained members, prepared to base their decisions on

54. “Investigation of the Board of Parole and the Prison Department of the State of New York,
stenographers minutes,” in Papers of Governor Alfred E. Smith, Albany NY, New York State
Archives (Box 65, 13682-53A) at 327.
55. Ibid at 401.
56. Ibid.
57. “New Parole Body and Pardon Plan Urged by Alger,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle (10 December
1926) 1. The Eagle published the Report of Alger’s Commission almost verbatim.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid at 2.
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expert assessments.60 Such a body of men could operate according to the latest
social scientific case management protocol. This arrangement would also allow
trained professionals to assist the governor in executing his authority to commute
sentences. Although the question of executive discretion was beyond Alger’s
brief, he used his report to highlight that the gubernatorial prerogative also sat
awkwardly in the modern administrative state.61 Mercy must remain but it must
also, somehow, be modernized alongside parole. Surprisingly, hardliners agreed.

VII. EXECUTIVE DISCRETION AS PENAL ANTIDOTE
Demands for tougher law enforcement registered at all levels of government
by the mid-1920s. President Calvin Coolidge launched a federal Crime
Commission in November 1925, as interstate crime increased under Prohibition,
but New York’s Crime Commission, launched in May 1926, gained a higher
national profile. Under Baumes’ leadership it oversaw the dramatic rollback
of indeterminate sentencing, earned release schedules, and liberal parole
provisions, which Progressive penologists had introduced over the previous
four decades.62 The Commission became a sharp-toothed watchdog snapping
at lapses in policing, punishment, and prosecution, but there was one branch of
government it handled with care: executive discretion. Despite the Commission’s
and Republicans’ regular harping over Smith’s liberal pardoning, the governor’s
prerogative survived while judicial discretion was mauled.
Taking a tough stance on prisoners’ opportunities to shorten their
sentences and clipping judges’ options to vary sentences according to individual
circumstances did not translate into disapproval of clemency. Indeed, mandatory
penalties heightened clemency’s symbolic significance. Liberal-minded critics
and benevolent associations hoped that gubernatorial clemency would reduce
unwarranted suffering. When PANY reported in 1927 that cases of “manifest
injustice” had come to light it projected that “cases of that kind can be taken
care of through executive clemency.”63 For different reasons Baumes resisted
demands from within his own party to axe executive discretion. If handled
60. Ibid at 1.
61. See Rachel E Barkow, “The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy”
(2008) 121:5 Harv L Rev 1333.
62. The Commission’s official brief was to examine the “crime situation” in the state, as well as
the “punishment treatment and pardon of convicted persons.” Mary M Stolberg, Fighting
Organized Crime: Politics, Justice and the Legacy of Thomas E. Dewey (Boston: Northeastern
University Press, 1995) at 101-102.
63. PANY Report, supra note 44 at 25.
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with far greater restraint and discrimination the pardon power could operate
without interfering with crime control. “In times like we are now experiencing,”
he advised, a soft-hearted approach to discretionary justice must stop:
It is extremely easy through the relaxing of rigid scrutiny of the merits of individual
applications for executive clemency and the giving of freer rein to sentimentalism,
to so hearten the criminal classes as to create in them a feeling of security that an
avenue of escape from the service of prison terms exists, no matter what the sentence
of the court nor the enormity of the offense.64

According to Baumes, building a road to a greater sense of security among the
law-abiding public required narrowing avenues for clemency and straightening
out protocol concerning applications for mercy. As it was currently practiced
executive clemency eroded the “majesty of the law,” but governors could shore
it up by dispensing mercy in the manner of a formal and solemn “judicial
proceeding.”65 Like Alexander Hamilton, Baumes regarded executive justice as a
tool of statecraft in dangerous times. But times had changed since the Revolution.
In the late 1920s the pardon power became the hard-liners’ antidote for possible
side effects of mandatory sentencing.

VIII.

HARD CASES, MERCILESS TIMES

When gunman “Bum” Rogers was sent away for life in November 1926 as a
repeat felony offender his sentence proved that mandatory sentencing was the
bitter pill needed to cure the ills produced by New York’s parole system. “Turning
the Criminals Loose,” an article that appeared in a social affairs magazine,
connected Rogers’ case to Presser’s to dramatize the “debauch of leniency” that
had infested New York’s penal system.66 It revealed that Smith, during his first
term as governor, had commuted Rogers’ fourteen-year sentence for assault after
he had served only two years. While on parole Rogers had committed numerous
armed robberies, one of which netted him a thirty-year sentence. Like Presser,
Rogers had managed to escape, but his recapture in 1927 allowed prosecutors to
try him under the new fourth offender laws, which the Appellate Division of the
New York Supreme Court had ruled constitutional in February 1927. The judge
who presided over Rogers’ trial sang from Baumes’ song sheet as he delivered the
64. “Executive Clemency,” in Baumes, Report of the Joint Legislative Committee,
supra note 51 at 27.
65. Ibid.
66. Lawrence Veiller, “Turning the Criminals Loose,” The World’s Work (5 March
1927) 546 at 549.
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sentence: “You have scorned society and as a spokesman for an aggrieved public
it is my duty to give you the punishment which your conduct deserves.”67
The turn toward unflinching severity attracted plenty of adherents, including
legislators in other states, but within New York opposition soon emerged. At the
November 1927 meeting of the New York State Conference on Social Work,
the head of the new Board of Parole, Dr. Kieb, denounced the mandatory
sentencing statutes’ impact on the prison population, inflating numbers to
dangerous levels. Democratic Assemblymen began to draft bills to restrict the
laws to violent offenders. Philanthropists and businessmen concerned about
de-investment in penal reform lobbied for the repeal of the laws.68 And quietly,
District Attorneys encouraged repeat offenders to plead guilty to misdemeanors,
while judges urged juries to consider convicting sympathetic offenders on lesser
charges. The cultured Century Magazine, one of many elite organs opposed to the
Baumes laws, observed that “not a few of our judges and prosecutors, as well as
penologists, have found occasion to bitterly denounce them.”69
It took an ideal case, a change of governor, and growing anxiety over the
ballooning state prison population and its attendant financial burden for the
exercise of clemency to correct an injustice imposed through mandatory life
sentencing. In 1928 Governor Smith gambled on a bid for the presidency and
lost, leaving his younger protégé, Democrat Franklin D. Roosevelt, to search for
the means to increase the legitimacy of parole in a climate hostile to ‘breaks’ for
criminals. Like his predecessor the new governor faced a Republican majority,
and Roosevelt knew that any move to loosen the binds of mandatory sentencing
would undermine his credibility as a crime fighter. Since Roosevelt was powerless
to change the law he cautiously administered the one corrective remedy Baumes
had left on the shelf—executive clemency. As protest and unrest reached a fevered
pitch in the state’s prisons the mitigation of Bart Garstin’s punishment pitted the
legitimacy of the Baumes’ laws against the prerogative of mercy.
67. “Sing Sing Doors Lock in Rogers for the Rest of Life,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle
(7 December 1926) 1 at 2.
68. Doctor Kieb spoke at the New York State Conference on Social Work, held in Troy, New
York, 15-17 November 1927. On 1 February 1927 Assemblyman Jerome G Ambro
introduced a bill to impose life sentences only when fourth-time offenders used a gun in
two of four offences. Adolph Lewisohn, the wealthy industrialist who had headed the 1919
Prison Survey Commission, wrote the Eagle’s editor to argue the need to consider individual
cases and to allow for case reviews. See, Adolph Lewisohn, “Too Many Prisoners,” Brooklyn
Daily Eagle (1 December 1927) A5.
69. Julius Hallheimer, “Justice by Formula: Who is an Habitual Criminal and What is a Felony,”
Century Magazine 17:2 (December 1928) 232 at 233.
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IX. A DOSE OF EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY
Garstin, a knock-about journalist, was no Bum Rogers, and his history of
offending included no acts of violence. In the argot of the day he was a serial
paper hanger, who had passed fraudulent cheques over a period of twenty-one
years. In his 1927 trial the number that mattered was four: his fourth conviction
for attempting to cash a worthless cheque in the amount of three hundred dollars,
which led to his imprisonment for life. Nine months into office as governor,
Roosevelt commuted that sentence and ordered Garstin’s release after he had
served only two years and four months in prison. “BAUMES LAW UNJUST
IN SEVERITY, ROOSEVELT HOLDS,” announced the first challenge the
statutes faced.70 The governor took care to explain his decision, emphasizing that
New York’s mandatory penalties had served a “salutary deterrent against crime.”71
Unfortunately, these laws also carried the risk of “grave injustice,” as Garstin’s
case illustrated.72 The District Attorney of New York County and the sentencing
judge had both agreed that the man’s crimes did not warrant a life sentence, and
their support allowed Roosevelt to leverage Garstin’s commutation into a plea
for the Republican-dominated legislature to modify the law. In the meantime,
gubernatorial mercy would rectify the injustice done to this one prisoner: “the
only way in which this man can be spared from spending his whole life in prison
… is by executive action.”73
Rather than denounce the governor’s commutation the Crime Commission
reframed it as proof that strict laws, with the prospect of clemency, were just.
The Commission’s Republican Vice-Chairman reminded New Yorkers that no
law could apply in every case. Assemblyman Burton D. Esmond declared this
was precisely why his party had criticized the liberality of parole while they
ensured that executive discretion remained available in exceptional cases. The
Republicans were not, however, prepared to modify the Baumes laws, and they
tried to turn Roosevelt’s commutation against him: “the Governor, in exercising
executive clemency, had made use of the very means provided for the purpose
of preventing the working of an injustice.”74 The hardline critic had evidence to
70. “Baumes Law Unjust in Severity, Roosevelt Holds,” Albany Times Union (23
September 1929) 3.
71. State of New York, Public Papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt Governor, Volume 1, 1929 (Albany,
NY: J.B. Lyon, 1930) at 470.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid at 468-70.
74. “Governor Wrong on Baumes Law, Is Esmond Claim,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle
(23 September 1929) 1.
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back his claim. By 1929, one hundred and sixty repeat felons had been sentenced
to life before Roosevelt acted in the case of Garstin. “Does the Governor know
of another case in which an injustice has been worked?”75 Esmond’s taunt was
justified. Smith and Roosevelt were more concerned about their political fortunes
than the suffering of minor criminals whose cases failed to fit the profile of a
solid test case.
Despite executive inaction in scores of other cases involving sentences
disproportionate to the gravity of prisoners’ offences, the penal landscape did
shift in the direction Roosevelt favoured, tilting support away from sentencing
rigidity. The punitive treatment of non-violent property offenders was just one
problem that critics raised. Another was the fact that most offenders found guilty
of violent first, second, or third offences paid a lower price than minor felony
offenders who were found guilty of a fourth offence. The first woman sentenced
under the Baumes laws was Ruth St. Clair, a young woman whose past crimes of
shoplifting led to her life sentence in 1930 for stealing two coats. Immediately
on sentencing her, General Sessions Judge Max Levine declared he would
strongly support a bid for clemency.76 One newspaper highlighted the travesty
of St. Clair’s sentence by contrasting it to the lighter punishment murderer Earl
Pecox received for strangling his wife and burning her body. Convicted of murder
in the second degree late in 1929, Pecox received a twenty-year sentence with
the prospect of parole if he followed prison regulations.77 Justice was wildly out
of kilter when anomalies of this nature surfaced, but how to restore a balance of
sound penal policy?
Over 1929 the need to address this question became critical as the state’s
prisons erupted in violence. Filled far beyond their capacity with a growing
number of lifers, Clinton and Auburn State Prison were rocked by three violent
outbreaks of prisoner protest. Just as liberal critics of mandatory sentencing had
projected, Baumes had set a time bomb when he left men deprived of earning
release no reason to obey rules and every inducement to use whatever means

75. Ibid at 3.
76. “Seek Clemency for Woman Lifer,” Shamokin News-Dispatch (13 February 1930) 7. St Clair
was convicted of grand larceny on 7 February 1930. In subsequent weeks the prosecutor in
the case and the Chief Magistrate added their support.
77. “The Wonders of the Law,” Brookfield Courier (18 December 1923) 6. Pecox was convicted
on 21 September 1929 of murder in the second degree in White Plains, New York. The
offence carried a sentence of twenty years to life.
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possible to protest.78 Some repeat offenders were fortunate to be spared from
joining lifers in the state prisons thanks to judges and prosecutors who induced
accused offenders to plead to misdemeanors, and to jurors who refused to
convict on felony charges, but such actions corroded confidence in the law. And
gubernatorial clemency, even liberally applied, could not defuse the likelihood
of future unrest. Added to this mix was the rising cost of imprisonment, which
strained the state budget to the breaking point after the economic crash late in
1929. An ever-growing population of felons with no prospect of parole and little
chance of a pardon became unsustainable.
Amidst this crisis Roosevelt’s hard-nosed commitment to reassert executive
power and to restore public confidence in parole led to a remarkable showdown
between the governor and his Republican foes. In 1927, when the Court of
Appeals upheld the mandatory sentencing laws, it had left a door ajar for their
future modification. Any “feeling that the punishment was too severe for the
nature and circumstances of the crime,” the Court had ruled, could be dealt
with by the executive or legislature.79 This is precisely what happened. Four years
after he crafted the landmark legislation that bore his name, Baumes eyed this
altered penal and fiscal field and buckled. In 1930 the senator agreed to a plan
Roosevelt devised to install a more professionally managed parole agency and
to reintroduce sentencing options for repeat offenders.80 The executive, working
with the legislature’s chief power broker, enhanced modern administrative
discretion, recuperated judicial discretion, and preserved the governor’s
prerogative to pardon.

X. CONCLUSION
The battle over discretionary justice in New York’s post-war decade could
be read as a tussle between political titans with opposing crime fighting
approaches. Because Roosevelt ultimately gained the upper hand presidential
historians have identified his outmaneuvering of Baumes and his Republican
majority as an early index of his penchant for a strong executive, supported by

78. “Baumes Law Modification Advocated,” Albany Times Union (14 February 1930) 2. This
story reported a speech by George M Alger before the Bar Association of New York,
13 February 1930.
79. People v Gowasky, [1927] 244 NY 451 at 466, 155 NE 737.
80. “Baumes Planning to take Sting out of Life Term Law,” Brooklyn Daily Eagle
(13 April 1930) 1.
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hand-picked experts, as the best means to steer public policy.81 Although this
interpretation is persuasive it focuses narrowly on US politics in the period
leading up to the Depression. The retreat from mandatory sentencing, viewed
through a wider lens, exposes enduring struggles between three branches of state
government. However, the settlement of 1930, which saw the establishment of a
professionally staffed Parole Division working within the Executive Department,
lends broader relevance to this episode in the history of discretionary justice.
The professionalization of parole did not displace the pardon, as most penal
histories claim or infer. Notwithstanding the growth of administrative discretion
in modern penal politics executive power persisted, most dramatically in respect
of death sentences. No one knew this better than the capitally convicted, and the
men who continued to exercise the power of life and death. One of the last men
to hold executive office while capital punishment remained in force, Governor
W. Averell Harriman, revealed in 1958 what it felt like to exercise a prerogative
tied to the divine right of kings: “Mercy is a lonely business.”82
The chief executive’s resilient pardoning power, despite a pervasive fear of
crime and the full-bore attack on discretionary justice in the 1920s, is a reminder
that evolving political and social currents lend historic penal practices new
meanings. Hay demonstrated how scholars could interrogate those historic values
when he asked why a system of pardoning endured for so long, in the face of
Enlightenment thinkers’ reasoned arguments that terror, counterbalanced with
frequent but uncertain mercy, provided an ineffective deterrent against crime.83
The attempt to tame mercy and disputes over its proper place in criminal justice
occurred not just in the Hanoverian period or under monarchical governance:
it also took place in republics, and as late as the 1920s. The recursive character of
swings between certainty and discretion in the delivery of criminal justice is less
surprising, perhaps, than the continuing relevance of individual protagonists in
these struggles. Whenever we take note of the king and his advisors, or an elected
governor and his legislative rivals, we acknowledge that some history-making
men (and only more recently women) have championed discretion while others
have held out against it. Taking positions in penal politics can bring fame or
infamy to political actors; in contrast, the Garstins and St. Clairs of the past
81. See e.g. William E Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New
York: Harper & Row, 1963); Roger Daniels, Franklin D. Roosevelt: Road to the New Deal,
1882-1939 (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015).
82. Averell Harriman & Murray Teigh Bloom, “Mercy is a Lonely Business,” Saturday Evening
Post 230:38 (22 March 1958) 24. Harriman was governor between 1951 to 1955.
83. Hay, “Property,” supra note 7.
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are known to us only because their cases for clemency suited the purposes of
power-wielders.
In an early appraisal of Albion’s Fatal Tree, the collection in which Hay’s essay
originally appeared, a reviewer alerted students of contemporary “American law
and criminology” to the work’s “theoretical and methodological implications.”84
For forty years, socio-legal scholars have followed that recommendation by
applying Hay’s understanding of mercy to contemporary penal problems.
In contrast, historians of criminal justice in the United States have all but
ignored it. There is ample evidence that discretionary justice troubled New
Yorkers during the Prohibition period as deeply as it did Blackstone, Beccaria,
or, indeed, Alexander Hamilton in the late eighteenth century. The terms of
discussion were different in the 1920s but the historic question remained the
same: how to uphold the ideology of the rule of law against the myriad grounds,
just and unjust, on which exceptions might be made? Modernity has proved no
match for discretionary justice; whether personal or administrative, it never fails
to penetrate penal justice, despite the earnest drive to certainty and the persistent
demands to terrorize criminals. Yet the directions in which it flows, and the depth
of its penetration, can never correct the systemic inequities of criminal justice.

84. Gerda Ray, Book Review of Albion’s Fatal Tree, Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century
England, by Douglas Hay et al, eds, and Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act,
by EP Thompson (1976) 6 Crime & Soc Just 86 at 87.

